This is exactly like that, more or less
I'm a fan of and subscriber to Tom Engelhardt's TomDispatch.com, a weblog sponosred by the Nation Institute. In it, Engelhardt monitors and comments on events and developments relating to Bush's wars and the generally deteriorating democracy in America.
The weblog was launched during the run-up to the Iraq war. It has gained a growing audience.
Engelhardt, who has written about war, culture and other topics, soon began drawing analogies comparing aspects of Vietnam with actions in Irag. As a matter of fact, many commentators were doing this. An experienced author and commentator, he cautioned about the limitations of analogies. They were useful, put not perfect. It turns out, the debate around the utility of analogies has bothered historians for some time -- as I learned when I ran into this essay
It is this attitude, among others, against which Friedrich Nietzsche rails in his essay “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life”. Nietzsche argues that “scientific history”, which values truth and objectivity above all else, harms the ability of men to live, and therefore should be hated. For the scientific historian, the past is nothing more than a series of facts to be discovered, analyzed, and preserved—the more facts the better, until “in the end modern man drags an immense amount of indigestible knowledge stones around with him which on occasion rattle around in his belly, as the fairy tale has it” (Nietzsche, 24). Against this model of history, Nietzsche identifies three types of historical study that he calls useful—the monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical (Nietzsche, 14). The monumental historian uses the past to provide guidance and inspiration for himself in the present, but in drawing parallels between the past and the present, he inevitably distorts the past. The antiquarian historian preserves the past for the sense of community and continuity that it offers, but since the antiquarian historian only examines his own past, he cannot view it with detachment or proportion. The critical historian examines the past, but then, as Nietzsche writes, “[drags] it to the bar of judgment, [interrogates] it meticulously and finally [condemns] it” (Nietzsche, 21). Scientific and useful history are irreconcilable because in using the past, one inevitably distorts, discards, or demeans the facts that the scientific historian so cherishes. Thus, when scientific history dominates, it becomes a case of “fiat veritas pereat vita” (Nietzsche, 23)—let there be truth although life perishes. While Nietzsche has correctly identified the dangers posed by an overabundance of respect for truth and objectivity, he has exaggerated the extent to which scientific and useful history are incompatible by failing to distinguish adequately the role of history for the individual and the role of history for society.referenced in an entry at this weblog:
What You Should Be ReadingFollowing instructions I found this interesting discussion of analogical thinking, which, in turn, led me to this: amplification upon the four functions of persuasive analogies in diplomacy.
Amy Lamboley at 06:17 PM (1/8/04)
Timothy Burke, one of my favorite bloggers, has proposed a few ground rules for the use of historical analogies in discussing current events. He writes:
Doing without historical analogy would be like trying to do without metaphor--and in some ways, it would also be like doing without the empirical substance of informed policy making. We can only predict what might happen by thinking about what has happened: it is the only data we have. Though one of the things we know about the past is how unreliable conventional wisdom about the applicability of historical analogies to new situations often has been. (I confess that one of my private, shameful pleasures as a historian is reading old newspapers in sequence and feeling a kind of unholy delight about how wrong the pundits of the day are about what’s going to happen next.)
Most present-day historians explicitly disavow attempts to analogize their work to present-day events, a tendency of which I disapprove (for more, see this essay on Nietzsche), as any justification for the pursuit of history as an academic discipline must ultimately rest upon its ability to teach us things about the present. Therefore, I find it highly encouraging to see a professional historian attempting to tackle the important question of how exactly one should go about mining the past for currently applicable wisdom. Go read.
It was a fruitful and entertaining pursuit. I recommend others to check these essays and discussions firsthand.

<< Home